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INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Louis Henkin* 
"International law is part of our law." Justice Gray's much-quoted pro-
nouncement in The Paquete Habana 1 was neither new nor controversial 
when made in 1900, since he was merely restating what had been estab-
lished principle for the fathers of American jurisprudence and for their 
British legal ancestors. And Gray's dictum remains unquestioned today. 
But, after more than two hundred years in our jurisprudence, the import of 
that principle is still uncertain and disputed. How did, and how does, inter-
national law become part of our law? What does it mean that international 
law is a part of our law? What is the relation of that part of our law to other 
parts of our law? 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS FEDERAL LAW 
When international law - "the law of nations" - first became part of 
our law can be readily stated; how it became our law has been a conceptual 
issue not without jurisprudential implications. That it is part of federal, not 
state, law has been recognized only recently. 
International law became part of "our law" with independence in 177 6. 
One view has it that the law of nations came into our law as part of the 
common law.2 In the eighteenth century, the law of nations was part of the 
law of England,3 and English law, including the law of nations, applied in 
her colonies. With American independence, the law of England in the colo-
nies (including the law of nations) was "received" as common law in the 
• University Professor, Columbia University. A.B. 1937, Yeshiva College; L.L.B. 1940, 
Harvard University; L.H.D. 1963, Yeshiva College. - Ed. 
Some of the issues discussed here were dealt with some years ago and somewhat differently 
in L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1975). 
1. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). Marshall made much the same statement in The Nereide, 13 
U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815). Marshall spoke of "the laws of nations," as did the Constitu-
tion and early statutes, rather than of "international law." The law of nations seems to have 
encompassed more than is comprehended by "international law" today, apparently including 
admiralty and general principles of the "law merchant" applicable to transnational transac-
tions. See Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States (pt. 
1), 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 26-27 (1952). 
2. See generally L. ERADES & w. GOULD, THE RELATION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS AND IN THE UNITED STATES (1961); R. MASTERS, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS (1932); P. WRIGHT, THE ENFORCEMENT OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 225-26 & n.10 (Uni-
versity of Illinois, Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. V, No. l) (1916 & reprint 1967); 
Dickinson, supra note l, at 26, 33; Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorpo-
ration, 26 AM. J. INTL. L. 239, 239 (1932); Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of Interna-
tional Law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 AM. J. INTL. L. 280, 282-85 (1932). 
3. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 228 (1796); Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478, 
1481, 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 938 (K.B. 1764); 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67. 
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United States.4 
A different conception sees the law of nations as coming into our law 
not by "inheritance" but by implication from our independence, by virtue 
of international statehood.5 An entity that becomes a State in the interna-
tional system is ipso facto subject to international law. While the obliga-
tions of international law are upon the State as an entity, a State ordinarily 
finds it necessary or convenient to incorporate international law into its mu-
nicipal law to be applied by its courts. In the United States, neither state 
constitutions nor the federal Constitution, nor state or federal legislation, 
have expressly incorporated international law; from our beginnings, how-
ever, following the English tradition, courts have treated international law 
as incorporated and applied it as domestic law. 
The two conceptions, and variations upon them, may bear different con-
sequences. If international law was part of the common law that each state 
received from England, international law was state law. It would cease to 
be state law and become federal law only if the U.S. Constitution, or an act 
of Congress pursuant to the Constitution, so provided. On the other hand, 
if international law became domestic law by virtue of independence, its sta-
tus as state or federal law may tum on the international character of our 
independence and the status of the states between 1776 and 1789. Some 
have insisted that during those years the states were thirteen independent 
states (in the international sense), each equal in status to England, France 
and other nations of the time, each subject to intemational law.6 Each state 
decided for itself whether to incorporate international law, but all of them 
did so, in the tradition inherited from England. On this view, as on the 
"common law" view, international law was state law between 1776 and 
1789 and remained state law unless the federal Constitution or later federal 
law pursuant to the Constitution rendered it federal law. 
A different view, however, concludes that the thirteen states were never 
independent States; for international purposes we were from independence 
one nation, not thirteen.7 By virtue of independence and statehood, inter-
4. See, e.g., Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) (Mar-
shall, C.J.); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. I, 35 & 43, I Cranch I, 36 & 43 (1801) (Marshall, C.J,); 
Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161 (1795) (Iredell, J.); see also Hill, The Law-Maki11g 
Power of the Federal Courts: Co11Stitutional Preemption, 61 CoLUM. L. REV, 1024, 1043 (1967), 
In Respublica v. De Longchamps, I U.S. I 19, I Dall. 111 (0, & T. Pa. 1784), a Philadelphia 
court treated a violation of international law as a violation of state law. I U.S. at 123, I Dall, at 
114. 
5. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J,); Chisholm v. 
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793); 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 26, 27 (1792). Compare the sugges-
tion that incorporation is implied in the constitutional grant of authority to Congress to define 
offenses against the law of nations, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see w. WILLOUGHBY, THE 
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW 295 (1924); cf. The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 
162 (1814) ("The law of prize is part of the law of nations .... [The doctrine in question] 
was the law of England before the Revolution, and therefore constitutes a part of the admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction conferred on this Court in pursuance of the Constitution."), 
6. See, e.g., Exceptions and Briefs of the Common Counsel States at 94-96, Supplemental 
Brief for the Common Counsel States at 283-311, and 1 Appendix to the Exceptions and Briefs 
of the Common Counsel States at 230-39 (testimony of Philip C. Jessup), United States v, 
Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975). 
1. See Morris, The Forging of the Union Reconsidered: A Historical Refutation of Stale 
Sovereignty over Seabeds, 14 CoLUM. L. REV. 1056 (1974). 
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national law became binding on the United States, not on the individual 
states. Between 1776 and 1789, there being no national domestic law, inter-
national law could not be incorporated into national law, but the national 
obligations of the United States could be carried out through state law and 
institutions.8 In 1789, the obligations of the United States to give effect to 
international law became effectively the responsibility of the new federal 
government, to be carried out through federal institutions (including fed-
eral courts), through state institutions (including state courts), or both. 
Between 1776 and 1789, then, international law was the law of each of 
the thirteen states, either as state common law, or by incorporation pursu-
ant to the state's international obligations or those of the United States. 
Whatever the basis, the status of international law as state law could have 
been changed, or confirmed, in 1789 when the states united into "a more 
perfect union" - but the new Constitution did not expressly address the 
matter. The Constitution recognized that the United States was subject to 
the law of nations and gave Congress the power to define offenses against 
the law of nations.9 The judicial power of the United States was extended 
to cases arising under treaties, cases affecting ambassadors, cases within ad-
miralty or maritime jurisdiction, and controversies to which foreign states 
or citizens are party.10 
But neither the constitutional grants to Congress and the federal courts, 
nor any act of Congress, declared or necessarily implied that the law of 
nations was incorporated as self-executing domestic law, 11 or that it had the 
status of law of the United States rather than of the states. Nevertheless, 
from our national beginnings both state and federal courts have treated cus-
tomary international law as incorporated and have applied it to cases 
before them without express constitutional or legislative sanction. 
Early in our history, the question whether international law was state 
law or federal law was not an issue: it was "the common law." 12 During 
the reign of Swift v. Tyson, 13 when federal and state courts determined the 
common law independently, they also determined and applied the law of 
nations independently; in doing so they did not, nor did they need to, char-
acterize international law as either federal or state law. State legislatures 
8. In 1779 the Continental Congress resolved that the United States would cause "the law 
of nations to be most strictly observed." 14 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 635 
(Yy. Ford ed. 1909). In 1781 it reco=ended that the states adopt laws to punish offenses 
against the law of nations. 21 id. at 1136-37 (G. Hunt ed. 1912). 
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Congress early gave the federal courts jurisdiction over 
civil actions "by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations." 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) (derived from the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77); see 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
11. It is plausible that admiralty and maritime law was incorporated by implication in the 
grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts. Maritime law was a very large component of the law 
of nations of the time. See note 5 supra; note 22 infra. 
12. See, e.g., cases cited at note 4 supra,· Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886-87 (2d 
Cir. 1980). State cases have not been numerous, see, e.g., Peters v. McKay, 195 Or. 412, 238 
P.2d 225 (1951), but state courts have regularly applied the international law of sovereign or 
diplomatic i=unity. See, e.g., Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Inst., 260 A.D. 
189, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940). 
13. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) l (1842). 
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did not assert authority to supersede it as internal law in the state. Congress 
sometimes incorporated international law by reference in federal legisla-
tion, 14 and sometimes acted to supersede international law with domestic 
law, but such acts of Congress did not declare or imply that international 
law was federal law.15 
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins16 ended the myth that there was an indepen-
dent "common law," broodingly omnipresent, which the federal courts 
could determine as well as, and independently of, the courts of the states. A 
federal court in diversity cases, it was decided, had to apply the law of the 
state in which it sat, and was bound to apply the common law of that state 
as determined by the courts of that state. So great a judge as Learned Hand 
apparently assumed that international law was part of state common law 
for this purpose and that a federal court in diversity cases had to apply 
international law as determined by the courts of the state in which it sat. 17 
It would follow, presumably, that a determination of international law by a 
state court was a question of state law, not of federal law, and thus was not 
subject to review, revision, or independent and final determination and har-
monization by the Supreme Court of the United States.18 Only where they 
14. In the area of criminal law, Congress has legislated against "piracy, as defined by the 
law of nations." 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982). An early version of that legislation, the Piracy Act 
of 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14, was upheld in United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 
Wheat.) 153 (1820). Also, Congress early legislated against assaulting diplomats "in violation 
of the law of nations." 18 U.S.C. § ll2 (1970) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1982)) 
{derived from the Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 28, I Stat. ll2, ll8); see Respublica v. De 
Longchamps, I U.S. ll9, I Dall. Ill (0. & T. Pa. 1784). 
Certain property claims were to be adjudicated according to "the law of nations." Act of 
Apr. 19, 1860, ch. 34, § 1, 12 Stat. 838, 838-39; see United States v. Repentigny, 72 U.S. (5 
Wall.) 211, 257-58 (1866). 
The Court construed article 15 of the Articles of War, IO U.S.C. § 1486 (1940) (current 
version at IO U.S.C. § 821 (1982)), which invoked "the law of war as including that part of the 
law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war .... " See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 
I, 27-28 (1942). 
15. The courts early began to assume that Congress did not intend to violate international 
law and construed statutes accordingly. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 
64, ll7-18, 2 Cranch 64, ll8 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. I, 43, 1 Cranch 
1, 43 (1801) (Marshall, C.J.). 
16. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
17. See Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1948): 
[S]ince the defendant was served while the cause was in the state court, the law of New 
York determines [the service's] validity, and, although the courts of that state look to 
international law as a source of New York law, their interpretation of international law is 
controlling upon us, and we are to follow them so far as they have declared themselves. 
However, Judge Hand continued: 
Whether an avowed refusal to accept a well-established doctrine of international law, or a 
plain misapprehension of it, would present a federal question we need not consider, for 
neither is present here. 
170 F.2d at 361. 
18. Before Erie, the Supreme Court had denied review of state determinations of interna-
tional law since such determinations involved questions of "general law" rather than "federal 
questions." See Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mex., 264 U.S. 440 (1924); New York Life 
Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1875); see also Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated 
Soviet Republic, 266 U.S. 580 (1924) . .But see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. at 
287-88 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
In addition, state courts felt free to go their own way in adjudicating matters governed by 
international comity rather than by international law. Compare Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 
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had jurisdiction on a basis other than diversity of citizenship could federal 
courts decide international law independently and differently from the 
states. 
Such a state of affairs, it was finally recognized, made no sense. Interna-
tional law, obviously, was not state law. The law of nations was the law of 
the political community of States developed by the practice of States and 
modified by State treaties, and it was the United States, not the individual 
states, that was the relevant national entity for international purposes. 
Questions of international law engaged the responsibility of the United 
States towards other nations. It made no sense that questions of interna-
tional law should be treated as questions of state rather than federal law; 
that they could be determined independently, finally and differently by the 
courts of fifty states, and differently also by federal courts for their own, 
"non-diversity" purposes; that, whereas the interpretation of a U.S. treaty 
was a federal question to be decided finally by the Supreme Court for all 
courts (and domestically, at least, for the political branches as well), deter-
minations of customary international law by state courts were not review-
able by the Supreme Court. Therefore, in a famous article, Judge Philip 
Jessup decried the notion that Erie v. Tompkins should be held to require 
federal courts to follow the determinations of international law by state 
courts in diversity cases.19 
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,20 the Supreme Court effec-
tively resolved the issue. In that case the Court reestablished the Act of 
State doctrine and declared it to be a principle off ederal law binding on the 
states. The Act of State doctrine is not a principle of international law, but 
instead a principle of judge-made, domestic "foreign relations law," serving 
the foreign relations needs of the United States. However, in deciding that 
the Act of State doctrine is federal law, binding on the states and not within 
the scope of Erie v. Tompkins, the Court invoked Judge Jessup's views re-
jecting the applicability of Erie to international law.21 As a result, there is 
now general agreement that international law, as incorporated into domes-
(1895) (refusing to give full faith and credit to a French judgment), with Johnston v. Compa-
gnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926) (giving full faith and credit 
to a French judgment). 
19. Jessup, The Doctrine efErie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 
AM. J. INTL. L. 740 (1939). In 2 THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 50 (New York 1788), Madison 
justified the clause in the Constitution giving authority to Congress to define offenses against 
the law of nations and criticized the absence of such authorization in the Articles of Confeder-
ation, which "consequently leave it in the power of any indiscreet member [i.e., state] to em-
broil the confederacy with other nations." 
20. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
21. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425. Judge Henry Friendly made clear that Erie v. 
Tompkins applied only to state co=on law in diversity cases where state law had to be ap-
plied, and that there was indeed, even after Erie, a "federal co=on law" - r:e., law made by 
the federal courts pursuant to authority delegated to them by the Constitution or Congress, or 
inherent in their character as courts. Such "co=on law" was federal law binding on the 
states. See Friendly, In Praise ef Erie-And ef the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 383 (1964). For the authority of the Supreme Court to determine the federal co=on 
law, and its supremacy to state law, see, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398, 423-27 (1964); Hinderlider v. La Plata River Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938); Hart, The Rela-
tions Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 489,500 (1954); Henkin, The Foreign 
Affairs Power ef the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964); Hill, supra note 
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tic law in the United States, is federal, not state law; that cases arising under 
international law are "cases arising under . . . the Laws of the United 
States" and therefore are within the judicial power of the United States 
under article III of the Constitution; that principles of international law as 
incorporated in the law of the United States are "Laws of the United 
States" and supreme under article VI; that international law, therefore, is to 
be determined independently by the federal courts, and ultimately by the 
United States Supreme Court, with its determination binding on the state 
courts; and that a determination of international law by a state court is a 
federal question subject to review by the Supreme Court.22 
To say that international law is U.S. law means that in principle it 
should be applied wherever U.S. law applies; it says nothing about whether 
international law (as U.S. law) applies in particular circumstances. Thus, 
there was much confusion when the Supreme Court declared, in Sabbalino, 
that courts in the United States should not sit in judgment on an act of a 
foreign State within its territory, even when the foreign act violated interna-
tional law. Critics wished to know why, in a case tried in a U.S. court, the 
court should not apply international law to declare the foreign act illegal if 
international law is part of the law of the United States. 
International law is law of the United States, but U.S. law (including 
4, at 1073-79; Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 196S DUKE L.J. 248; Note, Federal 
Common Law and Article III, A Jurisdictional Approach lo Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 32S (1964). 
22. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
(REVISED)§ 131, comments d, e, & reporters' notes 2-4 (rent. Draft No. 1, 1980) [hereinafter 
cited as RESTATEMENT (REVISED)]. 
In 2 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 305 (New York 1788), Hamilton cites "cases arising upon 
treaties and the laws of nations" as proper for the jurisdiction of federal courts. See also l 
THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 13-14 (J. Jay) (New York 1788). The law ofnations was linked with 
treaties in earlier drafts of what became article III of the Constitution; there is no evidence that 
its elimination was intended to deny federal status to international law. Perhaps it was consid-
ered that cases arising under international law were covered by the other cases or controversies 
enumerated. See text at note 10 supra; 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORD OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787, 136, 157 (rev. ed. 1937); 3 id. at 117 app., 608 app .. 
It is instructive to compare the history of admiralty and maritime law in the law of the 
United States. Maritime law came to the United States from England either by inheritance 
together with the common law, or by incorporation as part of the law of nations. See note I 
supra and accompanying text. Admiralty jurisdiction was expressly conferred by the Constitu• 
tion on the federal courts; the Supreme Court's adjudications were from the beginning recog• 
nized as supreme to state law and binding on state courts. The maritime law applied by U.S. 
courts in the early years was clearly international in origin, part of the law of nations; the 
courts looked to a "general maritime law" applied not only in England but in other countries, 
In the nineteenth century, however, maritime law in the United States was domesticated. It 
began to apply to internal waters as well as to international waters. Foreign citations became 
infrequent. Particularly because of the increasingly domestic character of the law, Congress 
was found to have legislative power to modify it, and Congress indeed modified it with little 
regard to developments elsewhere. A reasonably clear line developed between national mari• 
time law, which is "private" law addressing private interests and not governed by binding 
principles of international law, and the international law of the sea governing relations be-
tween States. When Congress legislated to modify admiralty law it was not violating any law 
of international character or any international obligation. See generally G. GILMORE & C. 
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, ch. 1 (2d ed. 1975); Note, From Judicial Gran/ lo Legislative 
Power: the Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (19S4). Today 
maritime law applied by the courts is U.S. law and only U.S. law; public international law 
remains international law, determined by international criteria, even when the courts incorpo-
rate and apply it. Congress cannot amend it; it can only supersede it for domestic purposes, 
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international law as part of that law) does not ordinarily govern an act by a 
foreign state in its own territory. For a U.S. court to apply U.S. law (includ-
ing international law as part of that law) to the act of a foreign state re-
quires a prior determination that U.S. law is applicable to the particular act, 
event, transaction or interest in the foreign country, say, under appropriate 
principles of conflicts of law or because Congress has so directed. In Sabba-
tino, the Supreme Court decided that, even if applicable principles of con-
flicts of law would direct the courts to apply U.S. law, the law that they 
were to apply included the Act of State doctrine, which precluded the appli-
cation of other U.S. law or policy, including international law as U.S. law, 
to the act of the Cuban government. When Congress later enacted the 
Second Hickenlooper Amendment, which directed the courts to apply U.S. 
law including international law, in certain circumstances, the courts pro-
ceeded to do so. 23 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE HIERARCHY OF U.S. LAW 
"International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and ad-
ministered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as 
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination. "24 
International law is not merely law binding on the United States inter-
nationally but is also incorporated into United States law. It is "self-execut-
ing" and is applied by courts in the United States without any need for it to 
be enacted or implemented by Congress.25 Since it is law not enacted by 
Congress, and the principles of that law are determined by judges for appli-
cation in cases before them, customary international law has often been 
characterized as "federal common law" and has been lumped with authen-
tic federal common law - the law made by federal judges under their con-
stitutional power or under authority delegated by Congress. 
In fact, however, to call international law federal common law is mis-
leading. It is like federal common law in that both have the status of fed-
eral law for purposes of supremacy to state law. And it is like federal 
common law in that determinations of customary international law by the 
Supreme Court are law in the United States and binding on the states. But 
it is not federal common law in other significant respects. Unlike federal 
common law, customary international law is not made and developed by 
the federal courts independently and in the exercise of their own law-mak-
ing judgment.26 In a real sense federal courts find international law rather 
23. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), qffd, 383 F.2d 
166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). 
24. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
25. Treaties, on the other hand, may be either self-executing or non-self-executing, and the 
latter, while equally binding obligations of the United States, are not incorporated into domes-
tic law so as to be applied by the courts. See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 7 Pet. 51 
(1833); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 108, 2 Pet. 253 (1829); R.EsTATEMENT {RE.VISED), supra note 
22, § 131(3) & co=ent h (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980). 
26. Determining international law is not to be confused with making U.S. federal co=on 
law under the broad judicial "foreign affairs power'' exercised in Sabbatino and elsewhere. 
See note 21 supra. 
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than make it, as was not true when courts were applying the "common 
law," and as is clearly not the case when federal judges make federal com-
mon law pursuant to constitutional or legislative delegation.27 The courts 
determine international law for their purposes, but the determinants are not 
their own judgments or the precedents of U.S. courts.28 In principle, the 
courts interpret law that exists independently of them, law that is "legis-
lated" through the political actions of the governments of the world's States. 
It is determined primarily and more authoritatively by international courts 
and with equal authority by domestic courts of other countries. And it is 
the executive branch, far more than the courts, that acts for the United 
States to help legislate customary international law. 
In general, it may not be important whether international law when ap-
plied by the courts is properly characterized as "common law" or merely 
described as "like common law in important respects." But the loose char-
acterization of the law of nations as common law has led - I think - to 
jurisprudential conclusions that are unwarranted. For a while, we have 
seen, referring to our customary international law as common law misled 
judges in diversity cases, causing them to treat international law as state 
rather than federal law. Recently, because they assumed that international 
law is, or is like, judge-made common law, a few lawyers have tended to 
relegate it to the subordinate status that federal common law has in the 
hierarchy of federal law - lower than that of treaties or statutes of the 
United States. In particular, they have argued that even if the United 
States has fully participated in and has supported the creation of a rule of 
customary law, such law is not self-executing, is not domestic law in the 
United States, and the courts should not give it effect in the face of an ear-
lier treaty or statute of the United States. Presumably, this view would also 
hold that the President cannot give effect to customary law in the face of an 
earlier treaty or act of Congress, although he is free to make and must give 
domestic effect to a treaty in the face of an earlier act of Congress. 
To understand that view, and why I have doubts about it, one must 
recall the accepted jurisprudence as it relates to the categories of federal 
law. The Constitution, we know, is supreme law.29 Acts of Congress and 
treaties of the United States are "inferior" to the Constitution. A statute 
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid; a treaty inconsistent with the 
Constitution may be binding internationally but will not be enforced as law 
27. International law is also not federal co=on law in that it is not subject to legislative 
modification by Congress. Congress can define offenses against the law of nations; it can pass 
laws inconsistent with international law, and the courts will give effect to the act of Congress 
and disregard international law. But Congress cannot legislate international law or amend it. 
A determination by Congress as to the rule of international law on a particular subject is not 
binding on the courts, although even if the courts do not agree with that determination, they 
may see fit to interpret the act of Congress as a directive to apply that determination as domes-
tic law without regard to what international law actually requires. See, e.g., the courts' treat-
ment of Congress' statement of international law in the Hickenlooper Amendment, Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), qffd., 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). 
28. A determination of international law by the U.S. Supreme Court, however, is law in 
the United States and binding on lower federal courts and on state courts. See RESTATEMENT 
(REVISED), Stlpra note 22, Introduction, at 1 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984). 
29. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, I Cranch 137 (1803). 
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in the United States.Jo The language of the Supremacy Clause of the Con-
stitution has been read to imply that laws and treaties of the United States 
are not only supreme over state law, but are equal in status and authority to 
each other.JI It is not unconstitutional for Congress to enact law inconsis-
tent with a treaty of the United States; it is not unconstitutional for the 
President, with the consent of the Senate, to make a treaty inconsistent with 
an earlier act of Congress. And in the case of inconsistency between a stat-
ute and a treaty, the later one will be given effect by the courts and by the 
executive. 
The place of federal common law, of federal law made by judges pursu-
ant to their inherent constitutional authority or to authority delegated them 
by Congress, has not been conclusively determined. In principle, any au-
thority exercised by the courts under their own constitutional authority 
ought to be equal to the authority of Congress or of the treaty-makers, and 
their "enactments" entitled to equal weight; here too the later-in-time might 
prevail in case of conflict. But the common law tradition that judges are 
bound by acts of the legislature, whether earlier or later, has discouraged 
the view that law made by judges pursuant to their own constitutional au-
thority is equal in status to legislation, and that federal courts can make 
federal law inconsistent with an earlier act of Congress.J2 Ironically, law 
made by courts not on their own constitutional authority but pursuant to 
authorization by Congress would presumably draw on congressional au-
thority and like a later act of Congress could supersede earlier legislation. 
Assuming that authentic federal common law cannot be made and given 
30. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I, 6 (1957) (Black, J.); RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra 
note 22, § 721 co=ent a & reporters' note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983). 
3 I. The equality of federal statutes and treaties in U.S. law, and the later-in-time rule, 
have commonly been supported by reference to the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Whitney v. 
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). It has been recognized that nothing in the Supremacy 
Clause requires this result; it says that both treaties and federal law are supreme as to state law, 
not that they are equal to each other. See The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 
(1870); Taylorv. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 785 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799) (Curtis, Circuit 
Justice), qffd, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 163-64 (2d ed. 1975). Both the equality of statutes and treaties and the later-in-time 
rule have, however, been upheld in numerous cases and seem firmly established. See cases 
cited this note supra; L. HENKIN, supra this note, at 410-13 nn.111-16. 
32. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), qffd, 383 
F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968) (giving effect to federal legislation 
modifying the Act of State doctrine as established by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino ). Com-
pare L. HENKIN,supra note 31, at 458 n.55 (1972), with R. FALK, THE AFTERMATH OF SABBA-
TINO (1965), and Cardozo, Congress versus Sabbatino: Constitutional Considerations, 4 
COLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 297 (1966). 
The Act of State doctrine was propounded by the courts on their own authority but it 
determined the substantive law to be applied - essentially a congressional responsibility. As 
to such judge-made law the case for congressional supremacy, rather than parity, is strong. 
However, judge-made "Jaw" that is rooted in the separateness and independence of the judici-
ary - e.g., rules of courts, perhaps even rules of evidence, and some aspects of the political 
question doctrine - implicates the judicial function, and may be constitutionally i=une 
from congressional regulation, or its existence might at least argue for judicial parity, if not 
supremacy, in regulation, but no case has so held. q. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 128 (1871) (Act of Congress held invalid since it infringed on the powers of the judicial 
and executive branches by prescribing a rule of decision to the former and impairing the par-
don power of the latter). 
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effect in the face of an earlier inconsistent treaty or act of Congress, some 
have suggested that the same is true also of customary international law. 
There is no authority for that view. The status of customary international 
law in the law of the United States in relation to treaties or acts of Congress 
has not been authoritatively determined.33 And, in principle, the argument 
for according customary law equal authority, and for applying the later-in-
time rule to it as well, is not unpersuasive. In international law, customary 
law and treaties are of equal authority and the later in time will prevail in 
case of inconsistency, when the parties so intend.34 The obligations of the 
United States under customary law are of the same status as its treaty obli-
33. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900). Some have interpreted the language in 
The Paquete Habana as implying that the eourts will not apply customary law if there is legis-
lation on the subject, even if the legislation predates such customary law. The Supreme Court 
did not face that issue and surely did not offer a eonsidered judgment on it. Even taking the 
Court's language seriously, it prescribes no such principle and may even suggest the contrary. 
Justice Gray said that eourts will look to customary law "in the absence of any treaty or other 
public act of their own government in relation to the matter." 175 U.S. at 708. I have read 
that to mean "in the absence of any supervening treaty or other public act." Gray was address-
ing the established law of nations, and particularly the law of prize, which antedated Congress 
and eongressional legislation; as to these, any act of Congress would be later-in-time. Gray 
was not addressing the possibility of principles that might be newly developed and that might 
conflict with an earlier eongressional disposition. Earlier in the opinion, Gray said that courts 
will look to customary law ''where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative 
act or judicial decision." 175 U.S. at 700 (emphasis added). The language suggests that it is 
not the existence of a legislative act, but of a controlling legislative act that would preclude 
application of customary law; an act of Congress might not be deemed controlling if it was 
enacted before the practice of States hardened into customary law. 
34. There is a presumption of interpretation against repeal of custom by treaty or of treaty 
by custom, but clear evidence that the parties so intended will be given effect. See Akehurst, 
The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 1974-1975 BRIT. Y.B. INTL, L. 273, 275-76. 
Supervening customary law has been held to supersede rights and obligations under the 1958 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea. Except in that they accepted the doctrine of the continen• 
tal shelf, the 1958 Conventions essentially eodified the traditional law of the sea, providing for 
large freedoms on the high seas subject only to a narrow territorial sea. During the following 
twenty years, and while the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea was in progress, states, 
including the United States, began to accept changes previously resisted. See, e.g., The Fish• 
ery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982). These changes, re-
flected in the 1982 Convention, included a wider territorial sea, transit passage (rather than 
merely "innocent" passage) through international straits, a very wide eontinental shelf, and a 
200-mile exclusive eeonomic zone. It is increasingly accepted that these changes have become 
customary law, and pro tanto supersede the different dispositions of the 1958 Conventions. See 
REsTATEMENT {REVISED), supra note 22, Introductory Note to Part V, at 55-56 (Tent. Draft 
No. 3, 1982). The United States, although a party to the 1958 Conventions (and despite its 
failure to sign the 1982 Convention), in effect agreed to abide by that customary law (as re• 
fleeted in the 1982 Convention), rather than by the 1958 Conventions when it proclaimed its 
exclusive eeonomic zone. See Proclamation No. 5030, 3 C.F.R. 22 (1983), reprinted in 16 
U.S.C.A. § 1453 app. at 203-04 (West Supp. 1984); United States Oceans Policy, Statement by 
the President, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 383-84 (Mar. 14, 1983). For the United States, 
customary law may also effectively modify U.S. legislation, including the Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982), the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), and numerous statutes that refer to waters under U.S. 
jurisdiction, which are now substantially extended. That the 1958 Conventions themselves 
largely codified customary law made it easier to find an intent to supersede the Conventions by 
change in custom. 
Compare the cases where subsequent practice between the parties to a treaty was held to 
have modified the treaty by tacit consent. See, e.g., United States v. France, 3 INTL. LEOAL 
MATERIALS 668 (1964), digested in 58 AM. J. INTL. L. 1016, 1023-27 (1964). The need for clear 
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gations; for the United States in its relations with other nations a later prin-
ciple of customary law would supersede a treaty obligation if so intended. 
In U.S. law, both treaties and customary law are law of the United States 
just as statutes are; like statutes, both are superior to state law. Treaties, it is 
established, are equal in status to statutes, and subject to the later-in-time 
principle; why should customary international law be oflower status? That 
U.S. courts cannot make domestic law inconsistent with an earlier act of 
Congress is not dispositive and may not even be relevant; customary law is 
not law made by U.S. judges or any other judges. Customary law is a mul-
tilateral international creation, made by the political processes of States, 
including the United States. It is akin to multilateral treaties, and some 
indeed see it as the result of tacit international agreement.35 Judges who 
determine and interpret the law do so much as they would an unwritten 
international treaty. There seems to be no authority in jurisprudence, nor 
any reason in principle, for giving customary law less weight than a treaty 
in relation to an earlier act of Congress. 
To some extent, the view that customary international law is inferior to 
treaties and to acts of Congress relies on the differences in their creation. 
Treaties are made by the President and Senate, but the Senate has no role 
in making customary law. There is reluctance to give status as law to prac-
tices of a single individual, the President, in which Congress did not have 
any part. But law is made by the President alone when he makes an execu-
tive agreement under his constitutional authority.36 In any event, our juris-
prudence from the beginning accepted customary law as law although it 
had been "legislated" before there was a Congress or a President, content to 
rely on the authority and the safeguards of the complex multinational pro-
cess by which such law is made. 
Much is made also of the fact that, unlike treaties, customary law is not 
mentioned expressly in the Supremacy Clause or in the constitutional list-
intent by the parties to have custom supersede a treaty is particularly strong in respect of a 
bilateral treaty. 
In a number of countries - Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands - trea-
ties prevail over inconsistent statutes even when the treaties are earlier in time. In Italy and 
Germany, customary international law takes precedence over domestic law even if the latter is 
later in time. See Sasse, The Common Markel: Between International and Municipal Law, 75 
YALE L.J. 695, 742-53 (1966). 
35. See Akehurst, supra note 34, at 275 n.5. 
36. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 
(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). Whether an executive agreement on the 
President's own constitutional authority would be given effect in the face of an earlier statute 
has never been determined. It remains a hypothetical issue as no such conflict has yet arisen. 
The President's case would be strong where the executive agreement dealt with a matter over 
which his constitutional authority was clear and dominant, for example diplomatic relations or 
the command of the armed forces. For the view that a presidential agreement should not 
prevail in a case involving an agreement regulating trade (where congressional authority is 
clear and dominant), see United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 659-60 (4th Cir. 
1953) (Parker, J.), ajfd. on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955). But see L. HENKIN, supra note 
29, at 185-87. 
Under the Constitution, even treaties that are expressly given status as law can be said to be 
made by the President alone, with the Senate not a co-participant but only a "brake." It is the 
President who "shall have Power ... to make Treaties,'' provided the Senate concurs. U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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ing of U.S. law in article III. I do not consider that omission significant for 
our purposes. The Supremacy Clause was addressed to the states, and was 
designed to assure federal supremacy. The federal law whose binding qual-
ity was mentioned in the Supremacy Clause included the Constitution and 
the laws and treaties made under the authority of the United States - acts 
taken under the authority of the new United States Government, authority 
which had to be impressed on the states and on state courts. The law of 
nations of the time was not seen as something imposed on the states by the 
new U.S. government; it had been binding on and accepted by the states 
before the U.S. government was even established. It was "supreme" over 
federal as well as state laws, and binding on federal as well as state courts. 
There was no fear that the states would flout it, and therefore no need to 
stress its supremacy. In any event, today it is established that customary 
international law, as incorporated into U.S. law, fits comfortably into the 
phrase "the laws of the United States" for purposes of supremacy to state 
law. We have also accepted customary international law as "laws of the 
United States" for purposes of article III. Indeed, it is only by including 
international law in "laws of the United States" that one can find a firm 
basis for the supremacy of federal interpretations of international law, or 
for federal jurisdiction over cases arising under intemational law.37 Is there 
any basis for finding parity and applying the later-in-time principle be-
tween some "laws of the United States" but not others? 
The process by which customary law is created is hardly certain and 
remains somewhat mysterious. Courts are often reluctant to conclude that 
a principle has become customary law, and they may be even more reluc-
tant to do so when the principle would be contrary to earlier congressional 
legislation. But where the existence of the principle is clear, and the world, 
including the United States, is living by it,38 there seems to be no compel-
ling reason to require courts to treat it as lesser law and to refuse to give it 
effect until Congress repeals the earlier statutory provision. 
It is not that international law is superior to an act of Congress; in U.S. 
law, this is not true. But customary law is "self-executing," and like a self-
executing treaty it is equal in authority to an act of Congress for domestic 
purposes. An old act of Congress need not stand in the way of U.S. partici-
pation in the development of customary law and courts need not wait to 
give effect to that development until Congress repeals the older statute. As 
with respect to a treaty, Congress can at any time legislate to supersede the 
development for purposes of domestic law. 
The view suggested here is not novel. Although the issue has not arisen 
and is still hypothetical, I think it has been the assumption of our jurispru-
dence from the beginning, as some scholars recognized long ago.39 Con-
37. See text preceding note 22 supra. 
38. No principle could become binding on the United States without its consent or acqui-
escence, since a State is not subject to a principle of customary law if it rejected that principle 
during the process of its development. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 22, § 102 
comment d (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980). 
39. See, e.g., Oppenheim, Introduction, to C. PICCIOTTO, THE RELATION OF INTERNA• 
TIONAL LAW TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND AND OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 12 (1915); 
Potter, Relative Authority of International Law and National Law in the United States, 19 AM. J. 
INTL. L. 315 (1925). 
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gress itself on several occasions agreed that courts should give effect to 
customary law, in the face of earlier legislative dispositions.40 
III. PRESIDENTIAL VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A different issue related to the status of international law in the law of 
the United States recurs whenever the United States acts in ways question-
able under international law. In our time, from Vietnam to Grenada, and 
in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, there have 
been charges - including some that are plausible, some compelling - that 
the United States was acting in violation of international law. As is "natu-
ral" in our society, those offended by an alleged violation have sought relief 
in the courts. Their argument has been that since international law is part 
of the law of the United States it is within the constitutional duty of the 
President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" (article II, 
section 3), and that that duty should be enforced by the courts.41 
There can be little doubt that the President has the duty, as well as the 
authority, to take care that international law, as part of the law of the 
United States, is faithfully executed. The President does that regularly 
when he assures respect, say, for the immunities of diplomats, or enforces a 
judgment of a court giving effect to the immunity of a foreign state. But he 
does not enforce international law when it is not controlling as law in the 
United States. For example, when Congress has enacted a statute inconsis-
tent with a provision in an earlier treaty of the United States, the President 
(like the courts) will enforce the statute, although in doing so he is not faith-
fully executing but indeed violating international law. Less well recognized 
than the power of Congress is a parallel, independent power of the Presi-
40. Early in our history Congress authorized the courts to consider certain claims and de-
cide upon their validity "according to the rules of law, municipal and international, and the 
treaties of the United States." Act of Jan. 20, 1885, ch. 25, § 3, 23 Stat. 283 (1885). In making 
such determinations the Court of Claims applied international law even in the face of an 
earlier statute. "It has been urged that a statute of the United States authorized resistance by 
our merchantmen to French visitation and search, to which there is the simple answer that no 
single state can change the law of nations by its municipal regulations." The Schooner Nancy, 
27 Ct. Cl. 99, 109 (1892); see also Royal Holland Lloyd v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 722, 736 
(1931); The Schooner Jane, 37 Ct. Cl. 24, 29 (1901); The Ship Rose, 36 Ct. Cl. 290, 302 (1901). 
In The La Ninfa, 75 F. 513 (9th Cir. 1896), the court gave effect to the ruling of an interna-
tional arbitration tribunal in the Behring Sea Controversy despite the fact that an earlier stat-
ute suggested a contrary position; the tribunal had been agreed to in a treaty and its decision 
later accepted by Congress. Convention on the Behring Sea Arbitration, Feb. 29, 1892, United 
States-Great Britain, art. I, 27 Stat. 947, 948, T.S. No. 140-41; Act of Apr. 6, 1894, ch. 57, 28 
Stat. 52, repealed by Act of Feb. 26, 1944, ch. 65, § 18, 58 Stat. 100, 104 (see also 16 U.S.C. 
§ 11-51). 
41. I do not address here several large but general questions: whether the President's duty 
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed is judicially enforceable at all, and if not, 
whether and in what circumstances it can be enforced by mandamus or injunction against 
lesser officials, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 
Cranch 137 (1803); whether a challenge to an act of the United States under international law 
raises a nonjusticiable political question, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); c.f. Henkin, Is 
There A 'Political Question' Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976) (suggesting that issues raised by 
the "political question" doctrine be analyzed under other, already established, doctrines); 
whether the Constitution applies abroad, see RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 22, § 721 
comment b & reporters' note 2 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983); and, whether particular plaintiffs, 
such as members of Congress, have standing to challenge the alleged violations. 
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dent under the Constitution to act at times in disregard of the international 
obligations of the United States. 
The responsibility of the President to take care that international law 
and U.S. treaties are faithfully executed derives from and depends on their 
status as law in the United States, a status derived from and dependent on 
their character as international obligations of the United States.42 For ex-
ample, if a treaty is void, or if it terminates, the treaty is not, or ceases to be, 
law in the United States. If, consistently with the terms of a treaty or where 
otherwise permitted by international law, the United States terminates or 
suspends a treaty's obligations, the obligation ceases to be law in the United 
States. If a treaty ceases to be law, there is, of course, neither duty nor 
authority to enforce it. And it is the President who, under the Constitution, 
has authority on behalf of the United States to terminate or suspend the 
treaty and thus to "repeal" it as law in the United States.43 
Other consequences flow from the fact that the President wears more 
than one constitutional "hat," and that he has authority in foreign affairs 
and in relation to international law separate from and independent of his 
responsibility to enforce the international obligations of the United States 
as domestic law. For every State has the power - I do not say the legal 
right - to denounce or breach its treaties, or to violate obligations of cus-
tomary international law. The Constitution does not allude to such power, 
but it is inconceivable that the Constitution intended to make it impossible 
or impermissible - unconstitutional - for the United States to violate a 
treaty or other international obligation. The power to do so was doubtless 
implied in the power to conduct our international relations, and, in general, 
it is the President who has that power on behalf of the United States. He 
can denounce a treaty when he deems it in the national interest to do so, 
even when such denunciation is a breach of international law. If he does 
so, the United States is responsible for the breach under international law, 
but the treaty is dead for the United States and is no longer law in the 
United States. 
Similarly, although both Congress and the President have the duty and 
authority to carry out the international obligations of the United States, 
both may take actions within their respective constitutional powers regard-
less of U.S. obligations under international law. It is established that Con-
gress, in legislating under its constitutional powers, can enact law 
inconsistent with an international agreement or other international obliga-
tion of the United States, thereby causing the United States to be in viola-
tion of that agreement or obligation. Similarly, the President, as the 
principal organ of the United States in foreign affairs, may make decisions 
within his constitutional authority that put the United States in violation of 
international law. Since neither Congress nor the President is constitution-
ally denied the authority to make decisions in disregard of international 
law, the courts will not require either the President or Congress to observe 
international law, nor will the courts invalidate such acts on the ground that 
42. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 22, § 131 comment b (Tent. Draft No. I, 
1980). 
43. See, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 476 (1913); RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra 
note 22, § 352 (Tent. Draft No. I, 1980). 
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they violate international law or a treaty of the United States.44 
In sum, the courts will enforce principles of international law and self-
executing obligations of U.S. treaties and will require officials, federal and 
state, to comply with them. But the President, in his constitutional capacity 
to act in foreign affairs, has power under the Constitution to denounce a 
treaty, effectively terminating the status of that treaty as law in the United 
States, even if such denunciation is in violation of international law. Simi-
larly, the President, at least by formal official act, can take measures within 
his constitutional authority that are contrary to a treaty or a principle of 
customary law. The courts will not enjoin such acts to give effect to or to 
compel compliance with international law.45 
CONCLUSION 
That international law is part of the law of the United States is asserted 
and accepted today as it was at our national beginnings. But nations, and 
the law of nations, and the United States and its place among nations, are 
different today; the nominal continuity in our jurisprudence masks radical 
development, much of it in our time. It is right that the law of nations, 
which is the responsibility of the U.S. nation, should be seen as incorpo-
rated in our national jurisprudence as national (federal) law. It seems right 
that courts of the United States should not assert a final say as to how the 
nation shall behave in respect of its obligations to other nations, and should 
not command Congress or the President to comply with international 
norms. For me, it seems right too that the courts should continue to give 
effect to developments in international law to which the United States is 
party, unless Congress is moved to reject them as domestic law in the 
United States. 
44. The rule may be different in respect of the few principles of customary law or provi-
sions of multilateral treaties that recognize rights for private persons, notably human rights. 
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT {REVISED), supra note 
22, §§ 701-703 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982). Those principles or treaty provisions are essentially 
for the benefit of individuals, principally a State's own inhabitants. They do not directly im-
plicate the State's foreign relations; in the United States the President's foreign affairs power 
should not warrant his violation of such rights. (Generally such violation would also run afoul 
of the U.S. Constitution.) Occasionally, the President may seek to deny rights to nationals ofa 
foreign state in retaliation for an offense to the United States, but to the extent that interna-
tional law forbids such measures when they violate important human rights, the President 
ought not to be free to take those measures. q: RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 22, 
§ 905 comment h & reporters' note 8 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984). 
45. See, e.g., Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 
(1960); The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925). In the cases growing out of U.S. 
hostilities in Vietnam, the courts gave no heed to arguments that the U.S. action violated 
international law. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 
386 U.S. 972 (1967); cf. United States v. Mitchell, 386 U.S. 972 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari); see generally RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 22, § 131 report-
ers' note 5 (Tent. Draft No. I, 1980). 
